Mali: A nation at war

Dr. James E. Sulton Jr.

JA International Correspondent

One oft used colloquialism in American conversations is the phrase “from here to Timbuktu.” But what does that really mean? In everyday English, saying “from here to Timbuktu” or “I’d go to Timbuktu for that” implies a trip that is very long, inconvenient, or to somewhere that feels like “the middle of nowhere.” It often carries a humorous or exaggerated tone, as in “I’m not driving from here to Timbuktu to pick that up,” or meaning “I’m not going ridiculously far for this.”

As happens too regularly during mindless discourse, people’s intended humor masks some vitally important African history. Timbuktu is a real city in northern Mali, on the edge of the Sahara, historically hard to reach from Europe and North America and thus imagined as remote and exotic. For centuries, Europeans had only scraps of information about it, yet they associated it with immense wealth from trans Saharan trade in salt, gold, and other goods, which gave the city a near mythical aura.

The Mali Empire developed in the western Sudan region of West Africa, centered along the upper Niger River in what is now mainly Mali, but also parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and The Gambia. It rose to prominence in the early 1200s and remained a major power into the 1500s, with its core state (Kangaba/Manding) forming even earlier as the Ghana Empire declined.

The ancient kingdom of Mali, often called the Mali Empire, was a powerful West African trading empire that flourished roughly from the 13th to the 16th century, renowned for its wealth in gold and influential rulers such as Sundiata Keita and Mansa Musa. It controlled major trans Saharan trade routes and shaped the political, economic, and cultural history of West Africa.

During the 1800s, European geographers and explorers treated Timbuktu as a prize destination: the French Geographical Society even offered a substantial reward for the first European to visit it and return with proof, reinforcing the idea that it was both far away and dangerous to reach. In English writing, “Timbuctoo” (an older spelling) was used figuratively for a far flung place at least until the mid 19th century; the BBC notes an 1863 letter saying, “I must go to Timbuctoo,” contrasting it with the more familiar city of Cairo, Egypt.

Today we must devote close attention not only to Timbuktu but also to the entire nation known as Mali, of which it is a part. One reason for this is that Mali is now torn by vicious internal combustion. In fact, the war in Mali today is a fragmented, multi layered internal imbroglio: a jihadist insurgency and a separatist rebellion against a military junta. The fight is overlaid with ethnic violence and foreign involvement that is increasingly threatening state collapse.

Mali’s quagmire is a complex civil war involving the central state, jihadist groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State, tribal separatists, and local militias. Armed Islamist coalitions wage insurgency across central and northern Mali, using sieges, improvised explosive devices, blockades, and targeted killings to control routes and communities. 

Tuareg separatist forces wage war with the central state and have been since the ruling junta scrapped the 2015 Algiers peace accord. They have retaken symbolic northern strongholds while the junta in the capital, Bamako, which came to power via coups in 2020–21, is preventing any real transition to civilian rule.

Over the past year (2025-26), the conflict in Mali has sharply escalated into nationwide offensives and coordinated attacks, including in the capital. Military operations have targeted military bases, infrastructure, fuel and transport routes, and urban access points, aiming to encircle major towns rather than hold territory outright. 

Strategically, the war is trending toward a protracted insurgency in which the state struggles to hold territory while non state actors gain leverage by controlling movement and economic lifelines. Annual deaths linked to militant Islamist violence in Mali have tripled under the junta, and recent large scale attacks suggest insurgent capacity now outpaces the army’s ability to respond. 

Heavy handed state tactics and foreign backed operations appear to be driving recruitment into jihadist groups and separatist fronts rather than containing them. Analysts increasingly warn that the risk of state fragmentation or partial collapse is real if political dialogue, inclusive governance reforms, and credible security arrangements are not pursued alongside military action.

Casualty figures from the Mali War, which began in January 2012 and continues today, are substantial but difficult to determine precisely. There is no single comprehensive death toll available, as the conflict involves multiple parties including government forces, Russian mercenaries, UN peacekeepers, various jihadist groups, and civilians.